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XV—‘I WISH MY SPEECH WERE LIKE A LOADSTONE’:
CAVENDISH ON LOVE AND SELF-LOVE
JULIA BORCHERDING
This paper examines the surprisingly central role of sympathetic love
within Margaret Cavendish’s philosophy. I show that such love fulfils a
range of metaphysical functions, and highlight an important shift in
Cavendish’s account vis-à-vis earlier conceptions: sympathetic love is no
longer given an emanative or mechanistic explanation, but is naturalized
as an active emotion. I further investigate to what extent Cavendish’s ac-
count reveals a rift between the realm of nature and the realm of human
sociability, and whether this rift really prompts an inward turn as some
interpreters have suggested.
I
Introduction. From a twenty-first-century perspective, love seems
very much divorced from metaphysical concerns. Current philosoph-
ical investigations into love’s nature tend to conceive of love as an in-
terpersonal and often subjective phenomenon—as a specific mental
state, or an attitude a person takes to another which can be cast in
terms of her appraisals, judgements, beliefs and desires.1 For many
early modern philosophers, by contrast, love still figured as much as
a metaphysical concept as it did as an emotion. Coloured and shaped
by both Stoic and Platonist notions of sympathy revived through
Renaissance natural philosophy, it played a part in accounting for
phenomena as varied as individuation, causation or the union be-
tween mind and body. The power of love, on such accounts, is far
more than a mere metaphor: love can unify and move particles of
matter as much as it can draw together individuals. At the same
time, the period also experienced a transition from a broad, ‘cosmo-
logical’ or metaphysical conception of love to a more internalized
1 For the former view, see, for example, Baier (1991) and Badhwar (2003); for the latter
view, see Velleman (1999), Jollimore (2011) and Helm (2009), among others.
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conception, which locates love first and foremost in the emotional,
interpersonal realm.2
In this paper, I investigate how this transition takes shape in the
philosophy of Margaret Cavendish. Looking at Cavendish’s concep-
tion of sympathetic love, we find both a strong line of continuity as
well as an intriguing shift.3 The idea of a universal sympathetic love,
I show, still pervades her metaphysics (§ii). Yet at the same time,
Cavendish no longer conceives of such sympathetic love as a stable,
‘cosmic’ force. Rather, she understands it to be nothing but the free
passions and desires of material beings (§iii). This ‘naturalization’
of sympathetic love in turn has powerful effects. Its harmony is no
longer a stable one, especially within the realm of human sociability,
where excessive self-love often derails sympathetic relations. No lon-
ger a transcendently grounded cosmic force, sympathetic love in
Cavendish thus emerges as a regulative ideal which may attain its
full reality only in fiction (§iv). However, contrary to what some
modern commentators have claimed, I suggest that this need not
lead us to view Cavendish as advocating a retreat from human soci-
ety. Rather, much of her work—both literary and philosophical—
can be seen as inviting us to emulate nature’s balance in cultivating
virtuous self-love and sympathy toward others (§v).
II
Love’s Ubiquity. On the cosmological conception of love the early
modern period inherited from the Renaissance, love was seen as far
more than a mere feeling. Instead, it was often couched in terms of a
universal relationship of sympathy, understood as a ‘mutual love’
that weaves through and unites the parts of the universe.4 Love be-
tween individuals, in turn, was conceived of as an instance of such a
sympathetic movement. Harking back to both the Stoics and early
2 For the beginnings of this transition in the Renaissance, see Ebbersmayer (2002).
3 By ‘sympathetic love’, I here understand (following Cavendish) love that arises through
and is ultimately constituted by the sympathetical motions of material parts, and which in
sentient beings can manifest in the form of passions or appetites. The following sections will
offer a more detailed discussion of the concepts and relations involved.
4 Ficino (1989, pp. 384–7), for instance, writes: ‘[T]hey say that the world is an animal . . .
and that it everywhere links with itself in the mutual love of its members (mutuoque mem-
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Platonism, Renaissance philosophers such as Ficino characterized
love as the ‘firm foundation of the whole creation’ (Ficino 1944, p.
152). Since everything has a common point of origin or divine cause,
they argued, everything must also have a ‘common love’ and ‘attraction’
based on its fundamental similarities (Ebbersmayer 2012, p. 138).
Giuseppe Gerbino poignantly summarizes the common image of the
world that underwrites this traditional view as one ‘in which love
and sympathy are still understood as intimately related principles of
an occult bond’. It evokes ‘a sympathetically coherent and unified
cosmos, in which the affinity or force of attraction between the parts
and the whole is experienced as love’ (Gerbino 2015, p. 104).
Renaissance notions of sympathetic love were soon challenged by
some early modern mechanists, who condemned them as mere occult
powers. But they were also incorporated by others, as is evidenced,
for instance, by Kenelm Digby’s attempt to provide a mechanical ex-
planation for the widely discussed practice of applying a healing
salve (the ‘powder of sympathy’) to the object that caused the wound
and was therefore thought to have a ‘sympathetical bond’ with it
(Digby 1658; Moyer 2015).5 Many early modern natural philoso-
phers and medical practitioners thus continued to view a wide array
of phenomena as requiring explanation in terms of a ‘sympathy’ or
‘affinity’ between the parts of nature. All things are unified and ani-
mated, the Cambridge Platonist Henry More explained, by ‘that
Magick Sympathy that is seated in the Unity of the Spirit of the
World, and the continuity of the subtile Matter dispersed through-
out’ (More 1712, p. 126). Similarly, the renowned medical scholar
Joan Baptista van Helmont argued that God’s vitality permeates the
created universe and endows all natural beings with activity and per-
ception, which in turn results in a ‘common attraction’ among them
(van Helmont 1621, §§142–3). And Leibniz’s pre-established har-
mony, according to which all substances mirror each other in perfect
coordination, equally seemed to bear both the marks of universal
sympathy and a divinely established order.6
Turning now to our protagonist in this paper, Margaret
Cavendish’s thoroughgoing materialism certainly differs from the
5 As Mercer (2015, p. 110) points out, widespread disagreements regarding whether sympa-
thetic powers could be explained on natural grounds or defied understanding persisted well
into the seventeenth century.
6 For discussion of all modern authors mentioned, see Mercer (2015). For a comprehensive
treatment of sympathy throughout the early modern period, see Lobis (2015).
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picture of nature offered by the thinkers just mentioned, who all con-
ceived of nature as in some way suffused by a divine principle.
However, Cavendish throughout her work pursues not only a mate-
rialist, but also a vitalist account of nature, in which sympathetic
love does continue to play a crucial role. ‘All things in the world’,
she writes in her Philosophical and Physical Opinions, ‘have an
Operative power; which Operation is made by Sympathetical
motions [and] Antipathetical motions, in several Figures’ (PPO, p. 6;
cf. PPO, p. 68).7 Like her Renaissance predecessors, for whom sym-
pathetic resonance between the human soul and instruments like the
aptly named viola d’amore served as one of the central images of
universal sympathy, Cavendish highlights the effects of music on the
passions of the listener as a central case of sympathetic love.8 ‘The
notes in musick’, she explains, ‘sympathize with passions, and with
the several thoughts’ and move the mind ‘to a tender pitty and com-
passion, and a charitable love, from whence proceeds a listning ear,
a helping hand, a serious countenance, a sad eye’ (PPO, pp. 439–
40). An important idea at play here, clearly echoing tradition, is that
this sympathetic relation between mind and music is grounded in a
fundamental similarity between them. Music has a sympathy to the
mind’s ‘rational motions’ because ‘the rational spirits move in num-
ber and measure, as musical instruments do’ (PPO, pp. 167–8; cf.
PPO, p. 139; P, p. 213; WO, p. 185). Due to this basic similarity,
musical patterns and figures can move the mind to imitate the move-
ments of the music, so that its passions become their expressions.
As for many thinkers before her, music for Cavendish is merely
one manifestation of the dynamics of sympathy as it unfolds
throughout the cosmos. And in Cavendish’s cosmos, sympathetic
love turns out to be ubiquitous indeed. Perhaps most visibly, there is
sympathy and affinity between minds. A good translation, Cavendish
7 Cavendish’s works are cited using the following abbreviations: BW: The Blazing World (in
Cavendish 1666); GNP: Ground of Natural Philosophy (1668a); NP: Natures Pictures
Drawn by Fancies Pencil to the Life (1656); ODS: Orations of Divers Sorts, Accommodated
to Divers Places (1662a); OEP: Observations upon Experimental Philosophy (1666); P:
Playes (1662b); PF: Poems and Fancies (1653b); PHF: Philosophicall Fancies (1653a); PL:
Philosophical Letters (1664b); PNB: Plays, Never Before Printed (1668b); PPO:
Philosophical and Physical Opinions (1655a); SL: Sociable Letters (1664a); WO: The Worlds
Olio (1655b). Full publication details can be found in the references section.
8 On the viola, see Gerbino (2015). On the early interest in musical resonance as an instance
of sympathy, see, for example, Palisca (2000) and Tomlinson (1993, pp. 101–44).
Strikingly, a version of this account is still present in Descartes’s Compendium musicae
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explains, is a translation where there is sympathy ‘between the genius
of the authors and the translators’ (WO, p. 12). When another person
returns our deep affection, they give rise to ‘a Union, Likeness, or
Conformableness, of . . . Actions, Appetites, and Passions . . . proceed-
ing from an internal sympathetical love’ (PL, p. 292). If romantic,
such ‘sympathetical conjunction’ between living beings may in turn re-
sult in the production of a new being ‘after their own likeness, either
in nature or shape, or both’. And perhaps, Cavendish speculates, even
‘worlds may be match’d by a sympathetical conjunction to produce
other worlds, as other creatures do’, for we do find ‘the planets by a
sympathetical conjunction to produce other creatures, as the sun and
the earth’ (PPO, pp. 97–8; cf. PPO, p. 37).
But not only does sympathetic love ground connections between
individuals. It also has a deeper metaphysical dimension, for it helps
account for the existence of an order in nature that transcends the
mere pushing and colliding of inert matter. An argument Cavendish
repeats in many of her writings is what we might call her ‘argument
from order’. Even though nature is thoroughly material, it must be
self-knowing, self-living and perceptive, otherwise it would run into
confusion (see, for example, GNP, pp. 6–7). Nature, for Cavendish,
is matter in motion, and these motions are of an intricacy, complex-
ity, and infinite variety that neither the coarse motions of the mecha-
nists’ ‘dead matter’ nor the Cambridge Platonists’ plastic natures can
account for. While the former simply fail to render the complexity of
natural processes intelligible, the latter posit mysterious immaterial
entities where there is no need for them. In answer to More’s conten-
tion that ‘blind matter’ alone could not have hit upon the intricate
order of nature without some further direction of an immaterial
‘spirit of nature’, she argues that it is indeed matter’s sympathies and
antipathies itself that direct its motions:
I answer, The Wisdom of Nature or infinite Matter did order its own
actions so, as to form those her Parts into such an exact and beautiful
figure, as such a Tree, or such a Flower, or such a Fruit, and the like;
and some of her Parts are pleased and delighted with other parts, but
some of her parts are afraid or have an aversion to other parts; and
hence is like and dislike, or sympathy and antipathy, hate and love,
according as nature, which is infinite self-moving matter, pleases to
move. (PL, p. 161; cf. WO, p. 175)9
9 For More’s argument, see More (1712, p. 212).
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Throughout her works, Cavendish invokes sympathetic love to ac-
count for the ordered behaviour of matter. While antipathies lead to
dissonances in natural movements and figures, mutual sympathy
brings about orderly and coordinated motions of matter (PPO, p.
107).10 Sympathetic love regulates natural processes such as mag-
netic attraction or the cycle of water, which Cavendish conceives of
as motions generated by the attraction of the sun (PF, p. 24).
Diseases are said to be caused by the sympathetic imitation of parts
of the bodies matter with the pathogen (GNP, p. 133). Within indi-
viduals, she identifies a ‘sympathetical agreement’ between rational
passions and sensitive appetites, which ‘so resemble each other, as
they would puzzle the most wise Philosopher to distinguish them’
(GNP, p. 63).
Further, sympathy functions as a principle of individuation and
‘conjunction’, both among individuals and their parts. As Susan
James points out, Cavendish holds that mechanist ‘dead matter’ the-
ory is incapable of explaining individuation. Matter devoid of inter-
nal activity and intentional states that is moved by external imposi-
tion only, Cavendish argues, could never form truly unified
individuals (James 1999, p. 223; see, for example, PL, p. 60). Her vi-
talist materialism therefore paints a very different picture. Matter,
she contends, is individuated into unified beings by a mutual desire
or love that is constituted by and results in further internal motions
of the material parts involved. When one material being or part of
matter performs and imitates another’s patterns of motion, a sympa-
thetic ‘conjunction’ is created between the two. In this way, parts of
nature which sympathize in their motions join together ‘as one body’
(PF, p. 9). Just as regular human societies are bound by love, there-
fore, so are the parts of a human being, or indeed any individual
creature:
In every Regular Human Society, there is a Passionate Love amongst
the Associated Parts, like fellow-Students of one Colledg, or fellow-
Servants in one House, or Brethren in one Family, or Subjects in one
Nation, or Communicants in one Church: So the Self-moving Parts of
a Human Creature, being associated, love one another, and therefore
do endeavour to keep their Society from dissolving. (GNP, p. 75)
10 All principal kinds of natural motion (contraction, attraction, retention, dilation, expul-
sion) are by nature either sympathetical or antipathetical, and also ‘sympathize with each
other’ (PPO, p. 33; cf. PPO, p. 161). Moreover, there is sympathy both in matter’s interior
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Any part of matter has both an innate love for itself and a passionate
love for other parts, and it is this passionate love that ‘sympatheti-
cally unites’ parts of matter into one creature (GNP, p. 68).
Creatures, Cavendish explains, are ‘associations’ of material parts
that join by ‘consent’, and whose mutual ‘love’ preserves their asso-
ciation (GNP, p. 17; cf. GNP, pp. 27, 32). The result of such associ-
ation is an inseparable ‘commixture’ of rational, sensitive and inani-
mate matter, which in turn enters into ‘agreeable combinations and
connexions . . . in all productions’ (OEP, p. 159).
This continued sympathetic cooperation of associated parts of
matter within a unified organism accounts both for its development
and its conception, during which corporeal motions ‘attract and in-
vite by sympathy’ other parts to help form it (OEP, p. 56; cf. PPO,
p. 75; PL, p. 167). Sympathetic love also explains an individual’s
persistence over time: as long as an individual’s ‘society’ moves ‘so
Sympathetically, as to commit few or no Disorders, or Irregularities’,
its unity continues. Yet once its motions become irregular, be it due
to internal disharmonies or external intrusions, decay sets in (GNP,
p. 86; cf. GNP, p. 80). Within a given creature, the motions of ani-
mated—sensitive and rational—matter have a particularly ‘strong
sympathy’, ‘conjunction’, or ‘affection’, since they are fundamentally
alike and like ‘Fellow-labourers . . . assist one another’ (GNP, pp.
21, 64; PP, p. 14). Their sympathetic love explains the close union
between our minds and bodies and also their interaction. Mind and
body affect each other by aligning and imitating their motions, so
that when sensitive and rational matter ‘move sympathetically, then
the Body is healthful and strong and the Mind in peace and . . .
understands well’ (GNP, p. 84). And while the rational motions usu-
ally direct the sensitive ones, they also sometimes move with the sen-
sitive ones out of ‘love’ for them, just as a parent may sometimes go
along with the wishes of their child out of affection (PF, pp. 36–7).
The sympathetic connection between rational and sensitive matter
even entails that we could infer someone’s mental states from their
physical ones if we only had sufficient knowledge:
Besides, who knowes but that the very thoughts of men may be known
by the temper of their body? for could men come but to learn the sev-
eral motions of the body, which ingenious observations may come to
do, they may easily come to learn the motions of the minde, and so
come to know the thoughts, which thoughts are the several figures
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therein, which figures most commonly move sympathetically, with the
motions of the body. (PPO, p. 171)
All passions and desires are equally individuated via sympathies and
antipathies among the motions of rational and sensitive matter
(GNP, pp. 70–1). Rational passions can occasion sensitive appetites
by compelling the sensitive matter to imitate its motions, and appe-
tites can occasion passions. Their moving in tandem, in turn, can
elicit a whole range of complex emotions: sensitive pain can elicit ra-
tional grief, sensitive pleasure rational delight (GNP, pp. 63–4). In
her Philosophical and Physical Opinions, Cavendish supplies an im-
age to describe the sympathetic workings of the mind by asking us to
think of the mind’s spirits as ‘little spherical Bodies of Quicksilver
several ways placing themselves in several figures, sometimes moving
in measure, and in order, and sometimes out of order’. She writes:
Imagine this Quick-silver to be the minde, and their several postures made
by motion, the passions and affections . . .. Love is when they move in
equal number, and even measure. . . . But all their motion which they
make, is according to those Figures with which they sympathize and agree:
besides, their motion and figures are like the sound of Musick; though the
notes differ, the cords agree to make a harmony. (PPO, pp. 15–16)
But not only does Cavendish appeal to sympathy to explain the asso-
ciation and interaction of parts within and between creatures. She
also evokes it as an ordering principle that accounts for the individu-
ation and persistence of species and kinds. ‘Like a sheperd’, sympa-
thy shapes and controls the motions of material parts so that the or-
der of species, elements and kinds is maintained. Even when a
natural being of a certain kind dissolves, is newly created, or other-
wise assumes a new figure, sympathy guarantees that these transfor-
mations always proceed in accordance with principles ‘fixed’ by
sympathetic relations (PF, p. 12; GNP, pp. 31–3). In the Grounds of
Natural Philosophy, Cavendish writes:
The reason that most Creatures are in Species, according to their sort,
and kind, is not only, that Nature’s Wisdom orders and regulates her
Corporeal Figurative Motions, into kinds and sorts of Societies and
Conjunctions; but, those Societies cause a perceptive Acquaintance,
and a united Love, and good liking of the Compositions, or
Productions: and not only a love to their Figurative Compositions, but
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Sympathetic love, in short, still plays a key role in grounding the order
of Cavendish’s ‘well-ordered universe’ (Boyle 2017). Her conception
of such love, moreover, still resembles received views. These reverber-
ate both in her central examples—the sympathetic effects of music,
the attraction of a magnet—and in her frequent appeals to similarity
along many dimensions—degrees of matter, shapes, motions—as
establishing or strengthening sympathetic relations.11 Sympathy’s
ubiquity, finally, not only highlights Cavendish’s closeness to tradi-
tion, but also brings out a key tenet of her vitalist materialism: that
even though our capacities may differ, we humans are fundamentally
but another part of nature, made of the same matter and subject to
the same forces (see, for example, GNP, p. 18). As human societies
and individuals are bound by sympathetic love, so are the parts of
any material being. Equally, the disharmonies that occur within a
body or mind are often no different from conflicts and disharmonies
within society at large: all are grounded in the antipathies of their in-
dividual parts, be they parts of bodily matter, conflicting beliefs, or
distinct human beings (OEP, pp. 41–2; GNP, pp. 61, 157–8).
III
Love’s Freedom. While Cavendish’s conception of sympathetic love
is thus still deeply connected to tradition, her particular brand of vi-
talism also influences and changes this conception in at least two im-
portant ways: first, sympathetic love becomes fully naturalized; sec-
ond, it is no longer conceived of as a stable force, but as the
voluntary self-motion of individual parts of matter. In this section, I
will trace both of these developments throughout Cavendish’s
works.
Cavendish’s naturalization of sympathetic love is certainly well-
contextualized as part of a wider effort in seventeenth-century natu-
ral philosophy to show that phenomena of ‘natural magic’ can in
fact be fitted within a secularized framework, and need not imply
any occult forces.12 Yet while her position aligns well with this
broader movement, it is also a radical one. For it reduces all
11 She does, however, no longer regard this condition as a necessary one; cf. PL, pp. 289–
90. For further discussion of the importance of similarity in traditional conceptions of sym-
pathy, see the introduction to Schliesser (2015).
12 For further discussion, see Shanahan (2014).
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sympathetic relations to mere passions and appetites, which are in
turn understood to be self-directed and purely material motions.13
Some, Cavendish explains in Letter 15 of the Philosophical Letters,
may ascribe sympathies and antipathies to ‘the influence of the
stars’, others ‘to an unknown Spirit’, and yet others to ‘the Instinct
of Nature’, or to ‘hidden properties’ or powers. But in fact ‘they are
nothing else but plain ordinary Passions and Appetites’ (PL, p. 289).
These passions and appetites, in turn, are—like everything else in
Cavendish’s cosmos—no more than motions of matter. Sympathy,
Cavendish contends, is no more than ‘dilating’, ‘agreeable’ motions
of matter ‘in one part or Creature’ (PPO, p. 107; PL, p. 289; cf.
PPO, p. 92). When these sympathetic motions agree with those of
another creature or part, they result in love, the ‘sympathetic mo-
tion’ or ‘dance’ of spirits that binds the pars of nature together
(PPO, p. 14; cf. PPO, pp. 107, 34).14 Antipathy, in turn, is grounded
in ‘contracting’ motions which are ‘disagreeable, and produce con-
trary effects, as dislike, hate and aversion to some part or Creature’
(PPO, p. 107; PL, p. 289).
Sympathetic relations, Cavendish agrees with her predecessors,
are as manifold as they are ubiquitous, because ‘there are many
Desires, Passions, and Appetites, which draw or intice . . . to some-
thing or other’. Yet sympathy is in fact ‘nothing else but natural
Passions and Appetites, as Love, Desire, Fancy’ (PL, p. 292). Love is
at times also more narrowly defined as proceeding from rational
matter only: ‘There are Sympathies of Sensitive Spirits, and Rational
Spirits; the one proceeds from the Body, the other from the Mind, or
Soul; the one is Fondness, the other is Love’ (WO, p. 150; cf. GNP,
pp. 71–2). The main difference between love and fondness is their
scope: while fondness is finite, lasting ‘no longer than the senses are
filled’, love ‘dwels in the Soul, and is never satisfied; but the more it
receives, the more it desires; so that this Sympathy is the Infinite of
Loves Eternity’ (WO, p. 150). But even the effects of the strongest
love, which brings about a ‘Union, Likeness, or Conformableness’ in
13 As Goldberg (2017) points out, the omnipresent spectre of atheism especially in mid-
century English philosophy plausibly caused many thinkers to shy away from embracing
such thoroughgoing materialism, and to postulate self-moving immaterial principles
instead.
14 Perhaps sympathetic love in Cavendish is thus best conceived of as the conjunction of
two kinds of motions: ‘dilating’, appetitive motions, by means of which material parts
‘reach out’ to other material parts, and ‘imitative’ motions, by means of which the figures
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the ‘Actions, Appetites, and Passions’, are at bottom merely further
motions like the ones that constitute it in the first place:
For this kind of Sympathy works no other effects, but a conforming of
the actions of one party, to the actions of the other, as by way of
Imitation, proceeding from an internal sympathetical love and desire
to please; for Sympathy doth not produce an effect really different
from it self . . . (PL, p. 292; emphasis added)
This conclusion is reiterated at length in the Philosophical Letters.
Sympathetic relations, Cavendish insists, are both caused and consti-
tuted by natural passions and appetites. These natural passions, in
turn, are the causes and constituents of all sympathetic phenomena.
The loadstone draws iron and the needle turns towards the North
due to ‘love and desire for association’, just as the flower turns to-
wards the sun ‘from which it receives benefit’. ‘Any thing’,
Cavendish concludes, ‘that has freedom and liberty of motion, will
turn towards those Places or Creatures whence it expects relief’ (PL,
p. 295).
This last passage in turn illustrates a second crucial change in
Cavendish’s conception of sympathetic love. Sympathetic motions,
she asserts, are associative or imitative motions that are initiated
through the often voluntary self-motions of the material parts in-
volved. For Cavendish, therefore, sympathy is no longer a cosmic
force or hidden power that things are simply endowed with. Rather,
it is something that is up to the individual parts of nature. It is no
longer a mere ‘fact’ of nature, but something enacted and chosen by
individuals.
In order to see this, we first need to delve a little deeper into some
of the philosophical commitments that underwrite Cavendish’s con-
ception. As we already saw above, she opposes mechanist or atomist
accounts of matter that reduce it to ‘a dull, dead and senseless heap’
of dust ‘blown about with winde’. For such a heap
could never produce such infinite effects; such rare compositions, such
various figures, such several kindes, such constant continuance of each
kinde, such exact rules, such undissolvable Laws, such fixt decrees,
such order, such method, such life, such sense, such faculties, such rea-
son, such knowledge, such power. (PPO, ‘A Condemning Treatise ’)
Matter—all matter—requires knowledge and a capacity for inten-
tional action in order to be able in the complex, coordinated manner
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that we observe in so many natural processes (cf. GNP, pp. 6–7). As
our investigation into sympathy’s metaphysical roles has further
revealed, the ordered self-motion of matter not only entails that mat-
ter must be ‘ubiquitously rational’, as commentators have often
pointed out (see, for example, Detlefsen 2007, p. 180); it must also
be ubiquitously sensing and feeling. Parts of matter must not only be
capable of perceiving the motions of other parts. They must also
form a desire to imitate or otherwise harmonize with these motions,
and have the ability to then move themselves accordingly. According
to Cavendish, nature is thus full of life and teeming with a multitude
of dynamic figures brought about by the self-directed motions which
are ‘the very nature’ of matter and the immediate cause of all natural
effects (PPO, ‘A Condemning Treatise ’).
In addition, Cavendish rejects any explanation of causal interac-
tion via a transfer of motion asshe believes that any such account
fails to recognize the essential materiality of motion. Matter just is
self-motion, and thus motion can neither be transferred upon impact
(as Descartes had proposed), nor can it be a mere ‘accident’ of a
body (as Hobbes would have it) (OEP, pp. 47–8; GNP, p. 2; PL, pp.
22, 532–3; see James 1999, pp. 223–5).15Accordingly, rather than
direcly transferring motion to each other, two parts of matter caus-
ally interact if one compels the other to move in accordance with the
figures of its own motions, thus giving it ‘occasion’ to move in a cer-
tain way.16 When sensitive matter, for instance, reacts to another
body’s matter, it is not simply pushed around by it. Instead, it imi-
tates its pattern of motion, moving itself in a similar way. Cavendish
often uses the metaphor of a dance to describe this: when two people
dance, one leads while the other freely imitates their pattern of
movement, and this is exactly what sensitive matter does when it is
affected by other matter in causation or perception (PPO, pp. 12–
13; cf. PHF, pp. 30–1; PF, p. 138).17 Cavendish’s tenet that matter is
intrinsically self-moving and the occasionalist account of causation
that follows in its wake thus imply a fundamental freedom of nature:
‘If man (who is but a single part of nature) hath given him by God
15 Against Descartes, see PL, p. 98 and OEP, pp. 49–50; against Hobbes, see PPO, p. 31
and PL, pp. 54–5.
16 Unlike other prominent occasionalists of her time, Cavendish does not postulate God as
the sole cause of causal change while denying causal power to agents in the created world.
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the power and a free will of moving himself, why should not God
give it to Nature?’ (PL, p. 95; cf. PL, pp. 11, 96, 214, 225; OEP, pp.
58, 109; SL, p. 273).
Cavendish’s model still allows for a degree of compulsion: parts of
nature may forcefully compel other parts of nature to act in certain
ways, for instance ‘by forcing these over-powerd parts to alter their
own natural motions into the motions of the victorious Party’ (PL,
pp. 356–7; cf. GNP, p. 105). However, oftentimes material parts di-
rect one another harmoniously, ‘by consent’, so that the parts harmo-
niously conjoin and meet in their figures. Some, Cavendish writes,
grow ‘by consent of parts’ into the ‘Wheele of Fire’ that is the sun,
others fly upwards, but then ‘by one consent’ fall back down as rain,
and yet others unite ‘by consent’ into the harmonious dance that con-
stitutes the health and life of an organism (PF, pp. 14, 17, 22;
Robinson 2010, pp. 202–3). The first, forced movement of parts,
Cavendish explains, is action ‘by compulsion’, while the second, har-
monious movement is action ‘by sympathy’ (PPO, p. 68).
Sympathetic interaction, therefore, always involves a voluntary har-
monization of agent and patient. Commenting on the relationship be-
tween the rational and sensitive parts of a creature, Cavendish
explains that ‘the Command of the rational, and the Obedience of the
Sensitive, is rather an Agreement than a constraint’ (GNP, p. 63).
Similarly, all creatures ‘are produced, or composed by the agreement
and consent of particular Parts’ (GNP, p. 31). Given the presence of
rational matter in even the most minute parts of nature, certain effects
depend on the ‘consensual’ sympathetic reaction of those internal,
self-moving parts of an object to the parts of matter that outwardly af-
fect it. Only if such sympathy is present do its parts ‘agree’ to imitate
the motions of the object externally affecting it.18 When a body for in-
stance becomes aware of another in perception, it may perceive it as
agreeable, and consequently love and desire it, or perceive it as dis-
agreeable, and withdraw:
Whensoever I say, that outward objects work or cause such or such
effects in the body sentient; I do not mean, that the object is the onely
immediate cause of the changes of those parts in the sentient body; but
that it is onely an external or occasional cause, and that the effects in
the sentient proceed from its own inherent natural motions; which
18 For similar readings, see O’Neill (2001, p. xxxii), James (1999, pp. 237–8) and Robinson
(2010, pp. 74–80).
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upon the perception of the exterior object, cause such effects in the sen-
tient, as are either agreeable to the motions of the object, and that by
way of imitation, which is called Sympathy; or disagreeable, which is
call’d Antipathy. (OEP, ‘Further Observations’, p. 59; cf. PL, pp. 156,
295; Detlefsen 2007, p. 168)
In all cases, the causal interactions that underwrite sympathetic rela-
tions are free motions brought about by internal desires, not passive
transformations imposed from the outside. For Cavendish, sympa-
thetic love is not passive, but active: it entails the will to be moved,
and therefore at the same time necessarily brings with it the freedom
not to be moved in such fashion. It is not a mechanical relation, but
involves freedom and choice on the part of the attracted material
parts, which move themselves according to their needs and desires.19
IV
The Dangers of Self-Love. The previous section has shown that for
Cavendish, sympathetic love is a voluntary and entirely naturalized
phenomenon: it involves nothing but the passions and appetites of
material parts, which lead them to adjust their self-motions to the
motions of other parts if they so desire. This conception moves her
beyond the unexplained or even occult forces sympathy’s opponents
saw as operative in traditional conceptions. But it also reveals a
more destabilized and divided cosmos, where the loving relations
that bind nature’s parts suddenly seem more fragile and frayed, espe-
cially within the realm of human sociability.
We already saw that Cavendish, like Hobbes, sees a tight relation-
ship between the workings of the natural and the moral world. Both
contain both unity and division, and, Cavendish explains, necessar-
ily so. For ‘if there were not contrary, or rather, I may say, different
effects proceeding from the onely cause, which is the onely matter,
there could not possibly be any, or at least, so much variety in
Nature, as humane sense and reason perceives there is’ (PL, p. 446).
The result of division is variety, and none would exist without it.
Cavendish’s thesis of the freedom of sympathy goes a long way to-
wards explaining this variety: There is ‘discord and division’ as well
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as ‘concord and composition’ among the parts of nature, brought
about by the free motions of material beings which sometimes be-
have in a regular, sympathetic, and sometimes in an irregular, anti-
pathetic manner (OEP, p. 16). Their sensitive and rational motions,
for instance,
do oftentimes cross and oppose each other; for, although several parts
are united in one body, yet they are not always bound to agree to one
action; nor can it be otherwise; for, were there no disagreement be-
tween them, there would be no irregularities, and consequently no pain
or sickness, nor no dissolution of any natural figure. (OEP, p. 145)
In addition, the epistemic limitations of created beings may lead to
errors in judgement, which in turn may lead them to move dishar-
moniously. As commentators such as Karen Detlefsen (2007) and
Deborah Boyle (2017) have argued, Cavendish views nature as a
whole as operating as an ordered system which follows certain prin-
ciples and prescribes certain ‘norms’ of behaviour (Detlefsen 2007,
p. 175) that account for both its stability and its complexity. Nature
thus possesses, as Cavendish puts it, an overarching ‘wisdom’,
through which ‘like a Monarchess’ she ‘orders and regulates her
Corporeal Figurative Motions’ (GNP, p. 32). Yet while nature her-
self ‘is infinitely naturally wise’, her individual parts or particular
creatures ‘may commit errors and mistakes . . . being but a part, and
not a whole’ (PL, pp. 509–10; cf. OEP, p. 144). Among the infinite
parts of nature there is thus ‘Antipathy as much as Sympathy’.
At the same time, however, there is also a constant rebalancing be-
tween ‘assistance’ and ‘resistance’, which leads to ‘a conformity in
the whole nature of Infinite Matter’ (PL, p. 446). ‘Nature’s funda-
mental actions’, Cavendish argues, ‘are so poysed, that Irregular
actions are as natural as Regular’ (GNP, p. 106). Indeed, she mar-
vels, ‘it seems to be Natures great Art to make all things subject to
War, and yet live in Peace, as not to make an utter Destruction’
(WO, p. 163).20 Moreover, what may appear as an instance of dis-
turbance may actually be an instance of harmony. A contagious dis-
ease such as the plague, for instance, while believed by ‘some
20 There is interpretative debate around whether Cavendish allows for true disorders in na-
ture (see, for example, Boyle 2017; Detlefsen 2007, p. 175), or whether these are merely ap-
parent (see, for example, Cunning 2016, pp. 210–420). As will emerge below, the
interpretation defended here entails that there are indeed true disorders, but that these are
artificial, not natural.
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experimental philosophers’ to be ‘a body of little Flyes like Atomes,
which go out of one body into another’, is indeed caused, Cavendish
argues, by a sympathetic imitation of material parts, ‘so that the
motions of some parts which are sound, do imitate the motions of
those that are infected, and that by this means, the Plague becomes
contagious and spreading’ (OEP, p. 54). Given our epistemic limita-
tions, while some motions of nature—importantly, what we call
‘Sickness, Pain, and Death’—may seem like true imbalances to us,
these are in fact nothing but manifestations of the infinite variety of
balanced natural motions (PL, pp. 331–2; cf. PPO, pp. 129–30; PL,
pp. 538–9).
Yet while nature fundamentally retains its balance of sympathy
and antipathy, the same does not appear to hold true of the world of
human sociability.21 ‘Though Man did fall’, Cavendish poignantly
states in the Philosophical Letters, ‘nature never did’ (PL, p. 278).
While the unified and vitally connected universe presented by
Cavendish’s natural philosophy seems to contrast starkly with a
Hobbesian mechanist picture of randomly colliding atoms, her de-
piction of human society carries strong Hobbesian undertones:
[O]f the society of men and women comes many great inconveniencies,
as defamations of womens honours, and begets great jealousies, from
fathers, brothers, and husbands, those jealousies beget quarrels, mur-
thers, and at the best discontent. (WO, p. 32; cf. Lobis 2015, pp. 71–3)
Cavendish’s Sociable Letters provide a particularly lively picture of
Cavendish’s bleak image of human sociability. They depict a world
of ‘Cholerick Ladies’ who sympathize neither with other women
‘nor with each other’, a discordant consort of scholars ‘whose dis-
course was their music’, but who soon ‘became so Violent and Loud’
that they would ‘have Fought, if they had had any other Wounding
Weapons than their Tongues’, a ‘malignant contagion of gossiping’
that is more dangerous and widespread than ‘all Malignant
Diseases’, and women who are so self-loving that in order to live
peacefully, most need to be ‘strangers to [their] own Sex’ (SL, pp.
65–66, 154–5, 179–81, 331).22 Friendships are tainted by jealousy,
men contrive how to advance in ‘Title, Fortune, and Power’, while
women plot and scheme in their support, always ‘ready to side into
21 For this point, see also Lobis 2015, p. 73.
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Factions’ (SL, pp. 42–3, 199–200, 12). A play within Cavendish’s
play Convent of Pleasure also exposes the harsh realities of mar-
riage, with negligent husbands lying ‘drinking all day in an alehouse’
and gambling away their estates, while their wives are home caring
for too many children and suffering in labour (PNB, pp. 111–17).
Not only social rivalries, but also depictions of outright war and
the equally destructive incursions of mankind into nature are a fre-
quent theme in Cavendish’s writings—the former undoubtedly shaped
by her own devastating experiences of the English Civil Wars. The
poem ‘The Earth’s Complaint’ describes the motions of the planets
around the sun as a ‘sweet music’ and ‘kind love’, only to then turn to
humanity’s torment and exploitation of earth: ‘O Nature! Nature!
Hearken to my cry; I’m wounded sore, but yet I cannot die./My chil-
dren, which from my womb did bear/Do dig my sides, and all my
bowels tear’ (PF, p. 106). She also cautions that such disorders may be
far more easily created than repaired. It takes, she emphasizes, far, far
longer for a society to unite than to divide, and ‘the ruines of War are
not so suddenly repaired, as made’ (PL, p. 408). While sympathies
and antipathies in the natural world thus still keep their balance, in
the social world, the latter seem to easily outnumber the former, to
grave consequence: ‘Nature being poised, there must of necessity be
Irregularities, as well as Regularities . . . but when there is a general
Irregularity, then the Society falls to ruine’ (GNP, p. 60).
A substantial divide therefore emerges. While there is disorder in
the natural world, since all its parts are free to sympathize or antipa-
thize, nature nonetheless remains fundamentally balanced. The
same, however, does not hold true of the realm of human sociability.
What explains this divergence?
The answer, perhaps surprisingly, brings us back to love, or, more
precisely, to self-love. In the Grounds of Natural Philosophy,
Cavendish distinguishes between ‘passionate love’ and ‘self-love’.
Passionate love is love between the parts within a creature or between
creatures, while self-love is the love each creature—and, in turn, each
of its parts—has for itself (GNP, p. 68). In its basic and natural form,
self-love is nothing other than an innate desire to preserve itself, which
is both ‘just’ and ‘natural’ (SL, p. 56). It is the most fundamental kind
of love, and the ground from which all our other passions arise:
Self-love is the ground from which springs all Indeavours and Industry,
Noble Qualities, Honourable Actions, Friendships, Charity, and Piety,
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and is the cause of all Passions, Affections, Vices and Virtues; for we
do nothing, or think not of any thing, but hath a reference to our selves
in one kind or other. (WO, p. 145)
All we do, Cavendish asserts, is motivated at bottom by self-love. In
its pure and natural form, self-love is central to the balancing the
passions that constitute all sympathetic and antipathetic relations in
nature. Self-love motivates material beings to enter into sympathetic
or antipathetic relations with other parts (PL, p. 35). All motions of
sympathy and antipathy, Cavendish argues, ‘proceed from self-pres-
ervation’, and ‘all things turn with self-ends; for certainly every thing
hath self-love, even hard stones’ (PPO, p. 68). Moreover, the harmo-
nious motions of love ‘lead by Reason’ which ‘lies as much in the
heart, as the head’ (PPO, p. 106; cf. PPO, pp. 108–9) are both the
foundation of ‘nature’s house’, as well as the source of the moral vir-
tues (WO, p. 145; PF, p. 133). Here, she again evokes the metaphor
of music: the virtuous can ‘tune’ their passions ‘like musical instru-
ments’, such that every note causes delight in the hearer and ‘the
mind dances in measure, the Saraband of Tranquility’ (PF, p. 51).
But human self-love can also be corrupted, thus giving rise to vio-
lent, limitless and destructive passions and appetites (WO, p. 142).
‘Like the Sun Beams, in one Point, as with a Glass, wherewith it sets
all one fire’, Cavendish writes,
so Self-Love infires the Mind, which makes it Subtil and Active, and
sometimes Raging, Violent and Mad; and as it is the First that seiseth on
us, so it is the Last that parts from us; and though Reason should be the
Judge of the Mind, yet Self-Love is the Tyrant which makes the State of
the Mind unhappy; for it is so partially Covetous, that it desires more
than all, and is contented with nothing, which makes it many times
grow Furious, even to the ruin of its own Monarchy. (WO, p. 145)
In the hands of humans, self-love therefore becomes a sharp and
double-edged sword. It is indeed ‘the nearest perfection of love’ be-
cause it is the source of all our other passions, and can ultimately
lead to true, selfless love of another (WO, pp. 145–6). Yet when
driven to excess, it can also become the source of numerous destruc-
tive passions and desires. At the same time, however, Cavendish
emphasizes that these destructive effects of excessive self-love are ‘ar-
tificial’ and only occur in the human realm. Hate, Cavendish argues,
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promotes vainglory, and divides where balanced love strives towards
unity (PF, p. 83). However, it is not an intrinsic part of nature,
whose ‘chief law’ is love. Rather, it is ‘an accident from love’ (PF, p.
73). Indeed, the ‘untruthful’ love that gives rise to hate, Cavendish
argues, is itself ‘artificial’, not natural. The same, Cavendish empha-
sizes, is true of all other excessive passions and desires: moderated
passions are ‘natural’, whereas violent, limitless passions and appe-
tites are ‘artificial’ and often shaped and manufactured by social
influences and constraints (WO, p. 144). Similarly, she draws a con-
trast between natural disorders and the artificial wars caused by us.
‘All Natural War’, she explains, ‘is caused either by a Sympathetical
. . . or an Antepathetical motion’. These motions proceed merely
from ‘Self-preservation’, since matter’s motions sculpt it into shapes
and figures, and these strive ‘to maintain what they have created’
(PPO, p. 6; cf. PPO, p. 41). The human war experienced by
Cavendish, by contrast, is described as an ‘unnatural war’ that
‘came like a whirlwind which fell’d down . . . Houses, where some in
the Wars were crusht to death, as my youngest brother Sir Charls
Lucas, and my Brother Sir Thomas Lucas’ (NP, p. 375).
A further manifestation of human self-love to which Cavendish
ascribes a particularly destructive force is the excessive human desire
for recognition and fame.23 Our desire for fame, she argues, is a de-
sire for self-preservation that extends beyond death. We do not
know whether we truly have immortal souls, but we do know that
our natural mind and body are subject to decay. Yet ‘to die for fame,
is to live longer in the memory of other men th[a]n he knows he shall
live in the life of his own body’ (WO, p. 37; cf. ODS, pp. 20–1).
Cavendish, it is worth noting, does not seem to regard our desire for
fame as intrinsically vicious. Not only does she often express and
comment on her own desire for fame, she also seems to have thought
this desire to be a basic feature of human psychology, and one that
can also motivate to virtuous action that gains us the recognition of
our peers (WO, pp. 1–5).24 However, more often than not, excessive
self-love transforms this desire into an unnatural striving to be recog-
nized at any cost, and to excessive ambition which then leads to war
and strife (WO, pp. 1, 51). It renders us selfishly concerned with our
23 For a detailed discussion of the human desire for fame and its connection to self-love, see
Boyle (2017, pp. 118–41).
24 In WO, pp. 1–5, Cavendish also draws a distinction a desire for ‘noble fame’ and a desire
for ‘bastard fame’.
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own fame and gains rather than with the welfare of the associations
of which we are a part. Moreover, it leads us to view ourselves and
our imagined immortality as rising above nature, our pride leads us
to think of ourselves as ‘petty gods’ entitled to use the rest of creation
for our own ends (WO, p. 143; OEP, Further Observations’, p. 24).
While self-love is therefore both natural and necessary to produce
the passions that move all parts of nature, in the human realm it can
lead to excessive passions with the power to disrupt the world’s nat-
ural balance of sympathies and antipathies.
But why, we might now want to ask of Cavendish, is this just true
of us? Does she not claim that we are, like everything else, merely
part of nature? Cavendish’s answer here is not as clear-cut as we
might wish it to be, but her texts certainly hint at a number of possi-
ble, and perhaps complementary answers.
A first possible explanation might appeal to the theological expla-
nation hinted at in the poignant passage from the Philosophical
Letters quoted earlier, where Cavendish alludes to the Fall and its
consequences. The role of religious doctrine in Cavendish’s philoso-
phy is, of course, a difficult one to determine. While recent commen-
tators (Hernandez 2018 and Nelson 2016, among others) have
forcefully—and to my mind convincingly—criticized a thoroughgo-
ing atheist reading of Cavendish, Cavendish is unquestionably ada-
mant to exclude theological matters from the realm of natural phi-
losophy, arguing that just as philosophical explanations do not have
a place in theology, theological explanations should not enter philo-
sophical ones (PL, p. 323). Nevertheless, they occasionally do enter,
if mostly indirectly, as in the discussion of van Helmont’s views of
which the quote in question is a part. There, Cavendish criticizes van
Helmont’s view that Nature, created for Man, ‘was defiled by
[Man’s sin]’ by drawing a sharp distinction between the original sin
of man and its impact on humanity, on the one hand, and ‘Infinite
Nature’, on the other, which could neither be ‘heightened nor dimin-
ished’ by such sin (PL, pp. 279–80), suggesting that there may in-
deed be a significant gap there.
Besides the obvious implication regarding humanity’s (but not
nature’s) fallen state, however, this response also seems to indicate a
deeper contrast: between the realm of infinite nature, which ‘knows
no contraries in it self, but lives in Peace’ even though its ‘several
actions are opposing and crossing each other’, and the realm of hu-
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particular, freely performed actions (PL, p. 280). In those actions,
Cavendish emphasizes, we can—as beings endowed both with a free
will and a capacity to guide it by the reflective power of our rea-
son—indeed go wrong and cause evil, ‘either because we are igno-
rant of the ends which we ought to pursue or because we know what
ends we ought to pursue but we wilfully deviate from them’.
Moreover, these actions can be construed as ‘unnatural’ in so far as
they—either knowingly or due to ignorance—contravene the natu-
ral order of things nature’s wisdom has established.25 Against the op-
pression of women, Cavendish argues that
it is not only uncivil and ignoble, but unnatural, for men to speak
against women and their liberties, for women were made by Nature
for men, to be loved, accompanied, assisted, and protected; and if men
are bound to love them by Nature, should they restrain them by force:
Should they make them slaves, which Nature made to be their dearest
associates, their beautifulest objects and sweetest delights? (ODS, p.
223)
In the same way, we might understand our excessive self-love and its
destructive consequences as culpable deviations from natural norms.
As we have seen, our desire for fame is a natural propensity. It is
also, as Cavendish points out, a specifically human one:
Next, the being born to the glory of God, Man is born to produce a
Fame by some particular acts to prove himself a man . . . the difference
betwixt man and beast, to speak naturally, and onely according to her
works without any Divine influence, is, that dead men live in living
men, where beasts die without Record of beasts . . . for the rational
soul in man is a work of nature, as well as the body, and therefore
ought to be taught by nature to be as industrious to get a Fame to live
to after Ages, as the body to get food for present life, for as natures
principles are created to produce some effects, so the Soul to produce
Fame. (WO, p. 2; cf. ODS, pp. 150–1)
Animals, Cavendish readily points out, also can develop pride or
ambition: horses or dogs can strive to outrun each other, and a pea-
cock can take pride in his feathers (WO, p. 141; Boyle 2017, p.
196). However, they—lacking the requisite form of rationality—do
25 This suggestion is inspired by Detlefsen’s (2007) appeal to ‘norms’ of nature in
Cavendish. Further support may come from the ‘strikingly traditional’ (Hernandez 2018, p.
132) free will defence of the problem of evil Cavendish offers in the Sociable Letters (SL, p.
355).
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not also strive for fame that outlasts their life; nor can they develop
distorted self-images that lead them to believe that they are placed
above creation. We, on the other hand, can indeed transgress in
these ways.
Moreover, Cavendish frequently emphasizes that the many artifi-
cial social conventions and expectations that pervade human society
can exacerbate or corrupt what may be otherwise be natural and
beneficial tendencies.26 Human self-love, Cavendish argues, is ren-
dered unstable and inconstant through ‘vain Opinions’, ‘false
Imaginations’, and ‘unsound Understandings’ that our overly ambi-
tious nature, further corrupted by the artificial conventions and pres-
sures of human society, bring about. Guided by excessive self-love,
we thus ‘ride in the Waies of Partiality, on the Horse of Flattery, to
the Judge of Falshood’ (WO, pp. 145, 104). The false hubris of
humans regarding the rest of nature in particular is a frequent theme
in Cavendish’s writings. She extensively criticizes the ‘presumptuous
self-love’ of the experimental philosophers, which leads them to
think that they can create new kinds and elements that transcend
nature’s order. Man’s self-love, she argues, has ‘filled him with that
Credulity of a Powerful Art, that he thinks not only to learn
Nature’s Ways, but to know her Means and Abilities, and become
Lord of Nature, to rule her, and bring her under his subjection’
(WO, pp. 340–1; cf. James 2018). Cavendish’s poetry also often
draws out men’s ‘foolish ambition’, which is often contrasted with
the actual skill and wisdom of other animals:
O man! O man! What high ambition grows
Within his brain! And yet, how low he goes!
To be contended only with a sound
Where neither life nor body can be found. (PF, p. 98)27
Cavendish’s suggestion thus seems to be that excessive human
self-love is often sparked by an exaggerated awareness of our ‘higher
capacities’, only to be set ablaze by the artificial conventions and
self-images we develop to set ourselves apart from nature.
Finally, Cavendish’s discussion of self-love and its corruptibility
also clearly resonates with the debates surrounding the concept that
26 Though she sometimes also emphasizes the improving effects customs, and especially ed-
ucation, can have on humanity (see, for example, SL, p. 284).
27 Among other texts, see also the highly ironic ‘A Moral Discourse of Man and Beast’ (PF,
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arose after the publication of Hobbes’s Leviathan. Many of his
contemporaries saw Hobbes as breaking with the Aristotelian con-
ception of self-love (philautia) that we also find in Cavendish,
according to which self-love can lead both to virtue and vice.28
According to the Aristotelian conception, self-love is of two varieties:
(i) the self-love of the vicious, who desire for themselves ‘the greatest
share when it comes to money and honours and bodily pleasures’,
and (ii) the self-love of the virtuous person, who serves ‘the supreme
element in himself and complies with it in everything’ (Nicomachean
Ethics 1168b; Maurer 2006, p. 82). Much like Cavendish, Aristotle
argues that no conflict arises between other-regarding virtues and
the self-love of the second kind, because this self-love has the ratio-
nal part of the soul as its object. Only vicious self-love is truly self-
centred, because it bars us from taking into account the interests of
others. Hobbes, by contrast, was seen as having divorced self-love
from virtue by claiming that rational individuals in the state of na-
ture only pursue passions that are self-directed, thus rendering vi-
cious self-love the only natural kind. Cavendish’s position seems to
offer an intriguing counterpoint to this Hobbesian view. On the one
hand, she does seem to follow Hobbes in taking a very bleak view of
human self-love as often excessive and vicious. Yet on the other
hand, her position ultimately emerges as an intriguing inversion of
Hobbes’s own, since while for Hobbes the world of human sociabil-
ity is the only way to master our self-love, for Cavendish it amplifies
or sometimes even brings about its destabilizing effects.
V
Conclusion: But a Fiction of the Mind? ‘I wish my Speech were like
a Loadstone’, the character of Virtue pronounces in one of
Cavendish’s plays, ‘to draw the iron hearts of men to pity and com-
passion, to charity and devotion’ (P, p. 224; Lobis 2015, p. 73).
While the sympathetic force of a magnet attracts reliably in the natu-
ral world, which is free from excessive self-love, the previous sections
have revealed an important disanalogy between the natural and the
social world as Cavendish conceives of them. The natural realm,
28 See Maurer (2006, p. 83), who also refers to discussions of amour-propre and intérêt
among French moralists such as La Rochefoucauld, Nicole and Abbadie. For Aristotle’s
conception of self-love, see Nicomachean Ethics 1168b–69a.
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despite the freedom of its parts and the irregularities that follow in
its wake, retains its fundamental balance and the stable sympathetic
relations which ground its order. The world of human sociability,
however, is marked by excessive self-love and the disorders it gives
rise to. Within the human realm, sympathetic love thus seems to be-
come a regulative ideal rather than a cosmic fact—an ideal which is
in fact rarely attained.
In Cavendish’s writing, this ideal emerges in its most tangible
form under the heading of ‘Platonic love’, through which, as she po-
etically describes it, the souls of lovers mix as painters create shad-
ows in mixing colours (PF, p. 56). The resulting ‘unity of minds’ is a
frequent motif in her plays, fictions and letters—which are meant to
create such unity with a fictional correspondent—but also in the ide-
alized depictions of her own marriage.29 Platonic love also crosses
gendered lines: in Cavendish’s utopia The Blazing World, the en-
counter between Empress and Duchess produces ‘such an intimate
friendship between them, that they became Platonick Lovers, al-
though they were both Females’ (BW, p. 93). ‘The Emperess’s Soul’,
Cavendish describes their encounter, ‘embraced and kiss’d the
Duchess’s soul with an immaterial kiss, and shed immaterial tears,
that she was forced to part from her, finding her not a flattering
Parasite, but a true friend’ (BW, p. 123). This supposed immaterial
nature of Platonic love seems to elevate it above selfish bodily desire.
Yet it also—given Cavendish’s very thorough materialism—seems
to remove it from physical, material reality, rendering it a mere
‘Fiction of the mind’, exemplified perhaps by nature in its harmonies,
yet unattained, and maybe forever unattainable by humanity (BW,
b*r). Indeed, in the Grounds of Natural Philosophy, Cavendish seems
to draw precisely this conclusion. ‘One whole Mind’, she writes there,
‘cannot perceive another whole Mind; By which Observation we may
perceive, there are no Platonick Lovers in Nature’ (GNP, pp. 21–2;
this and the previous quote cited in Lobis 2015, 101).
Prima facie, this conclusion seems to sit well with a popular read-
ing of Cavendish, according to which her negative view of human
sociability prompts her to turn inward almost solipsistically:
Cavendish took refuge in a concept of sympathy between souls as a
way of solving the problem of sympathy in society . . . ultimately
Cavendish’s development of a moral idea of sympathy ends up not in
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altruism—or ‘benevolence’, a keyword of late seventeenth-century and
early eighteenth-century moral philosophy—but in egoism, one might
even say autism. (Lobis 2015, p. 74)
While this reading perhaps does not paint the most flattering picture
of Cavendish, there is certainly some textual evidence to recommend
it. She often juxtaposes her descriptions of the wars and strifes of
‘the Publick World’ and of mankind as ‘Ill-natur’d and Cruel’ with
praises of a retired life that is neither ‘Vext with Cares nor worldy
Desires’, where the ‘Mind lives in Peace’ and its thoughts engage in
conversations driven by ‘Sympathetical Endeavours’ (SL, pp. 61–2,
56–7; GNP, pp. 160, 75). She bluntly declares that ‘certainly a soli-
tary life is the happiest’, and in her fictions, her female protagonists
often strive for ‘a Retired Life . . . free from the Intanglements, con-
fused Clamours, and rumbling Noise of the World’ (WO, p. 27; SL,
p. 55). Moreover, in her writings, imaginary worlds abound—in-
deed, their construction itself is a frequent theme—and in them,
characters often share the relations of perfect love and sympathy
that she finds so lacking in the real world. However, in doing so,
some of her interpreters argue, she herself lets these relations collapse
into an excessive form of self-love, or, as Catherine Gallagher puts
it, into ‘total self-referentiality’ (Gallagher 1988, p. 30).
But while there is certainly a part of Cavendish that looks in-
ward, perhaps yearning for love and sympathy lost, there also
seems to be another. And this part, it seems, wants to pull the
world towards her and desires to move it with her imagination, de-
siring her speech to have the power to attract and to move other
minds to imitate its figures, just as the loadstone attracts the com-
pass’s needle and leads it to face north. Cavendish’s imaginary
worlds, for one, do seem to be more than mere escapes into fantasy.
They are also places where women can showcase their true talents
in ways which the reality of Cavendish’s society precludes, and
thereby demand their acknowledgment. In The Blazing World, for
instance, the empress encounters numerous ‘men of science’ who
are all eager to engage in a sustained dialogue about their studies,
and who all profit from her expertise. (The real Cavendish, of
course, often had the opposite experience.) Similarly, in
Cavendish’s play Bell in Campo, a group of women follow their
men onto the battlefield. However, instead of staying out of the
way as they had been told to do, they end up forming an army of
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their own, which—cleverly led by a female strategist—rescues their
faltering husbands from defeat.
But perhaps it is Cavendish’s own and often-evoked desire for liter-
ary fame that serves as the clearest sign of her outward-looking side.
Not as an illustration of excessive self-love, which she herself so
decries, but as evidence of a desire to be heard and to enter into the
sympathetic discourses that would mitigate its effects—as a writer and
as a woman who not only imagines better worlds, but would like
others to share in them and, ultimately, help make them a reality.30
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge
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Cambridge CB3 9DA, UK
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